Sharon and Gene Atkinson v. Gem Insurance Company, & Premier Medical Network & Sara Meadowcroft and John Does 1 to 20, inclusive : Reply Brief by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1997
Sharon and Gene Atkinson v. Gem Insurance
Company, & Premier Medical Network & Sara
Meadowcroft and John Does 1 to 20, inclusive :
Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
John Farrell Fay; attorney for appellant.
Kevin J. Fife, Jeffrey R. Oritt.
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Atkinson v. Gem Insurance, No. 970491 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1997).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/1021
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
SHARON and GENE ATKINSON, 
Plaintiffs/Appellants, 
vs. 
GEM INSURANCE COMPANY, & 
PREMIER MEDICAL NETWORK & 
SARA MEADOWCROFT, and 
Does 1 to 20, inclusive, 
Defendants/Appellees 
Case No.: 97-0491-CA 
Category: 15 
REPLY BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS - APPELLANTS ATKINSON 
Appeal from t h e Third J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t Court 
S a l t Lake County, S t a t e o f Utah, 
Honorable HOMER WILKINSON, Judge P r e s i d i n g . 




K F U 
5r 
1
 JCKET NO. °n~nMl<fr 
JOHN FARRELL FAY, ESQ. USB#5691 
Legal Counsel 
P.O. Box 68-1454 
1662 Bonanza Drive 
Park City, Utah 84068-1454 
425-658-2441 
KEVIN FIFE, ESQ. 
Cohne, Rappaport & Segal 
P.O. Box 11008 
525 East First South, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008 
801-532-2666 
FILED 
Utah Court of Appeals 
MAY - 8 1998 
Julia D'Alesandro 
Clerk of the Court 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
SHARON and GENE ATKINSON, 
Plaintiffs/Appellants, 
vs, 
GEM INSURANCE COMPANY, & 
PREMIER MEDICAL NETWORK & 
SARA MEADOWCROFT, and 
Does 1 to 20, inclusive, 
Defendants/Appellees 
Case No.: 97-0491-CA 
Category: 15 
REPLY BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS - APPELLANTS ATKINSON 
A p p e a l from t h e T h i r d J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t C o u r t 
S a l t Lake C o u n t y , S t a t e of U t a h , 
H o n o r a b l e HOMER WILKINSON, Judge P r e s i d i n g . 
JOHN FARRELL FAY, ESQ. USB#5691 
L e g a l Counse l 
P .O. Box 68-1454 
1662 Bonanza Drive 
Park City, Utah 84068-1454 
425-658-2441 
KEVIN FIFE, ESQ. 
Cohne, Rappaport & Segal 
P.O. Box 11008 
525 East First South, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008 
801-532-2666 
TABLE OF CONTENTS: PAGE: 
CORRECTED STATEMENT OF FACTS 1 
ARGUMENTS 3 
Premier as Gem7 s Agent 3 
Emergency Surgery 5 
Abscessed Teeth vs. Poisoned Blood 6 
General vs. Local Anesthesia 7 
Defendants Off-Point Arguments 9 
Issues Other Than Coverage Issues 11 
Surviving Issue 14 
Defendants Admission That Summary 
Judgment Was Not Warranted To Some 
Causes of Action 21 
CONCLUSION 21 
Exclusions Must Be Clear 22 
Defendants Interpretation Unreasonably 
Restricts Coverage 22 
Surgery Was A Medically Necessary 
Sickness Procedure 24 
Relief Requested 25 
Proof of Service 2 6 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES: PAGE: 
STATUES 
California Civil Code, Section 3511 13 
Insurance Code's, "Claims Practices Act, 4 
U.C.A. 31A-26-303(l). 
Utah Code Annotated 31A-26-303 (2)(a) and 19 
3) (b) and (h). 
CASES 
Alf v. State Farm. 850 P2d. 1272, (UT 1993) 22 
Atherton Condo Bd. V. Blume Development. 799 P2d. 20 
250, (WA, 1990) 
Barney v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.. 185 CA3d 972; 230 4 
Cal.Rptr. 215, 
Beck v. Farmers. (1985) 701 P2d. 795, 2,18,19 
Broadwater v. Old Replublic.(UT. 1993) 854 P2d 527, 4, 20 
Miller v. Elite Ins. Co..10 CA3d.739; 161 Cal. Rptr. 23 
322, (CA 1990) 
Northwest Mutual Ins. Co.. v. Farmers Ins. Group. 5 
16 CA3d 1036; 143 Cal. Rptr., 415, CA, 1978) 
State v. Irwin. 924 P2d 5, (UT Ct. App., 1996) 14, 16 
Uckerman v. Lincoln National Life Ins. Co., 588 P2d. 1 
142, (UT. 1978) 
Village Inn v. State Farm. 790 P2d. 581, 22 
(UT App., 1990) 
Wagner v. Farmers Ins. Exchange. 786 P2d. 763, 22 
(UT App. 1990) 
Wilder v. Tanouye. 753 P2d. 816, (HA, 1991) 19 
RULES 
Utah Rules Appellate Procedure, Rule 24(a)(9) 1, 3 
Utah Insurance Commissioner's Rules (R590-89-4 4 
(A) (B) and (F) ) 
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 901 (b) (4) 1 
r 
CORRECTED STATEMENT OF FACTS: 
Plaintiffs/Appellants initially move to correct certain errors in 
the Defendants'/Appellees' Statement of the Case. In their brief 
Defendants/Appellees assert: 
1) "Premier pre-authorized the surgery . . . " Brief, pages 3 
and 8, Defendants offer no reference to the record confirming 
this because there is no documentation. Premier never authorized 
the suraerv nor any part of it. To make assertions without 
citations to the Record violates Rule 24(a)(9) of the Utah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure. Also, in Uckerman v. Lincoln Natfl Life 
Ins. Co,. 588 P2d. 142, (UT. 1978) the court said: 
The Supreme Court need not, and will 
not, consider any facts not properly 
cited to, or supported by, the record. 
At page 5, point 6, Defendants assert, ''Premier refused to 
certify Plaintiffs' request for pre-certification of the hospital 
charges . . . " Direct contradiction of this misrepresentation is 
found in Appendix WA" to Plaintiffs' Opening Brief. This exhibit 
is a letter from Premier to the Atkinsons wherein Premier says it 
"was unable to pre-certify" the Atkinsons' request for benefits 
because "it did not meet (Premier's) criteria for medical 
necessity/appropriateness.» Record 6, point 12; and 36, point 12; 
146, 191, point 4. (It is a document admissible under Rule 901 
(b)(4) of the Utah Rules of Evidence*) 
2) That Mrs. Atkinson "attempts to have the court believe that 
their contractual claim is for more than the hospital charges. 
It is not." Brief @22 Plaintiffs have complained of a direct loss 
in paying for the surgery in addition to claiming the costs and 
reasonable attorney's fees associated with this lawsuit, for 
severe emotional distress and for other special and general 
damages. Record @ 24-25. Under, Beck v. Farmers. (1985) 701 P2d. 
795, 801-802, all these are recoverable contract damages. 
3) Defendants say they moved for summary judgment "after 
Plaintiffs had conducted significant discovery.1* Defendants' 
Brief, pages 4 and 8. The only discovery accomplished was that 
Plaintiffs served 2 sets of interrogatories and 2 requests for 
production of document (on each Defendant) which produced 1560 
documents. Yet, Defendants first filed their motion for summary 
judgment on 10/17/96 only 90 days after answering Plaintiffs' 
complaint on 07/17/96. Record, 60 & 33. No depositions were set 
before Defendants brought their motion and Judge Wilkerson 
suspended further discovery during the pendency of the summary 
judgment motion. Record @ 294, page 11, lines 5-7. Plaintiffs 
had no opportunity to depose anyone concerning any of the 1560 
pages of documentation Defendants produced. 
4) *GEM paid benefits for the oral surgery, anesthesiologist, 
anesthesia, and all other benefits related to the oral surgery . 
. .* Brief, page 7, point 16 and pages 11, 22 & 23. GEM and/or 
PREMIER never certified any part of the Plaintiffs' request for 
benefits. Again, Defendants make no citation to the record 
proving GEM certified any part of the Atkinson's request for 
benefits. Thus, again they violate Rule 24(a)(9) of the U.R.A.P. 
GEM paid certain charges connected with the surgery only after 
they were on formal notice that Plaintiffs intended to sue them. 
Recordf 194, 235. GEM paid the first claim 05/06/96 only 46 days 
before Plaintiffs' filed their lawsuit and the policy requires 
the Atkinson wait at least 60 days after notice to GEM of the 
claim before filing suit. Recordf 220, 1, 111, and 251. It is 
clear that since Defendants never approved any part of the 
Plaintiffs' request for benefits, they were not going to pay for 
it. And it was only by the threat of an incipient lawsuit that 
GEM finally paid certain costs associated with the surgery. 
Plaintiffs characterize such conduct as bad faith, 
A R G U M E N T S : 
PREMIER AS GEM'S AGENT: 
Defendants a l l ege , "Premier i s not an insurer a t a l l . Also 
P l a i n t i f f s do not have a d i r ec t cont rac tua l r e l a t i o n s h i p with 
Premier." Brief, page 6, point 7, P l a i n t i f f s have a l leged and 
Defendants have agreed Premier i s an agent of GEM. Record, 85, 
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143-145, and 188-192. Plaintiffs allege Premier is GEM's agent 
when deciding whether to pre-certify or deny certification to a 
GEMfs insured's request for benefits. Likewise, Premier is GEM's 
agent under the definitions promulgated by the Utah Insurance 
Commissioner's Rules (R590-89-4 (A)(B) and (F)) and under the 
Insurance Code's, "Claims Practices Act", U.C.A. 31A-26-3Q3(1). 
Record, 143-145, 188-192, 
Plaintiffs are third party beneficiaries of the GEM - Premier 
contract. Record, 145-146; 188-192. As additional authority for 
the Atkinson's right to sue Premier in bad faith because Premier 
was 6EMfs agent and that the Atkinson's were third party benefic-
aries of the GEM - Premier contract, Plaintiffs cite, Barney v. 
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 185 CA3d 972; 230 Cal. Rptr. 215, 219: 
Where a contract confers on one party a discretionary 
power affecting the rights of others, a duty is impose 
to exercise that discretion in good faith and in 
accordance with fair dealing, (citations omitted.) 
Further, under Broadwater v. Old Republic, (UT, 1993) 854 P2d 
527,536, third party beneficiaries are those persons: 
Recognized as having enforceable rights created in them 
by a contract to which they are not parties and for which 
they give no consideration• (citations omitted.) 
To have an enforceable rightf the contracting parties must 
have clearly intended to confer a separate and distinct 
benefit upon the third party* (citations omitted.) 
See also arguments in 
Record, @ 145-146; 188-191-
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Plaintiffs have alleged GEM and Prezoier acted in bad faith, made 
misrepresentations and conspired to defraud them of the benefits 
of their contract. Record, 5-18 In Beck, our Supreme Court 
recognized both an insurer's duty to act in good faith and that a 
breach of this duty can result in tortuous causes of action. 
Beck supra, @ 800, ftnt. 3 
Plaintiffs herein are members of the class (GEM's insureds) for 
whose benefit the GEM - PMN contract was expressly made and 
consequently are expressed third party beneficiaries thereunder. 
A third party may enforce contract expressly made 
for his benefit and in appropriate cases his right 
to enforce the contract extends to implied covenants. 
Northwest Mut. Ins., v. Farmers Ins. Grp, 76 CA3d 
1036; 143 Cal. Rptr., 415, 421-422. (CA 1978) 
EMERGENCY SURGERY: 
Counsel argues, "Mrs, Atkinson's treatment was not of an 
emergency in nature in that the treatment took place approx-
imately 10 months after diagnosis." Brief, page 12, Yet, on 
12/15/95, Dr. Bull said: 
. . . .She underwent two vessel coronary artery bypass 
grafting at Salt Lake Regional Medical Center on November 
6th, 1995. In follow-up she made a satisfactory recovery 
following this procedure. She now requires oral surgery 
for removal of multiple abscessed teeth. . . . 
Record, @ 257 
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On 12/20/95, Dr. Castle said: 
Sharon Mayes-Atkinson has symptomatic artery disease for 
which on November 6, 1995, she had two vessel coronary 
bypass graft surgery. At that time, she had abscesses in her 
mandible for which she was treated with antibiotics. It has 
been strongly recommended that she have this corrected as 
soon as her cardiac condition and recovery have stabilized." 
Record, @ 258. 
On 12/20/95, Dr. Walker said: 
The above named patient is scheduled to have a subtotal 
odontectomy on December 29, 1995 at Salt Lake Regional 
Medical Center. . . . 
Record, @ 259. 
And on 12/21/95, Dr. Evers said: 
. . , . At this time she is stable . . . 
Recordf @ 256 
Basically, these records reflect Sharon Atkinson underwent heart 
surgery on 11/06/95 and the problem of the abscessed teeth 
required immediate medical intervention so soon as she stabilized 
from the surgery. She was considered stable on 12/21/95 and 
surgery was scheduled for 12/29/95, eight days later. The delay 
from 12/29/95 to 02/05/96 was solely caused by Defendants refusal 
to approve the surgery. In the interim, Plaintiffs had to secure 
the money for the surgery. So, in difference to Defendants' 
counsel's opinion, the records reflect this was urgent surgery. 
ABSCESSED TEETH vs. POISONED BLOOD: 
Defendant's counsel argues the condition underlying 
Mrs. Atkinson's surgery was "abscessed teeth" in difference to 
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"poisoned blood," Brief, @ 10 & 18. The distinction is medically 
without merit. It is not contested that her four treating doctors 
agreed that her abscessed teeth required extraction. Why? Because 
they were "abscessed," "Abscess" means, a localized collection of 
pus formed by tissue disintegration and surrounded by an inflamed 
area, American Heritage Dictionary, New College Edition. 
Mrs. Atkinson needed the teeth removed to stop further infection, 
i-e,, to stop further disintegration of the tissue surrounding 
her teeth. The infection, the pus was entering her bloodstream 
and this needed to be stopped. Thus, the underlying condition 
addressed by extracting the teeth was the pus generated by the 
tissue disintegration. This was a medical problem and should have 
been covered under the medical provisions of her policy. 
Assuming arguendo, this was not a "medical1' problem but rather a 
dental one, in moving to stop the infection, the surgery was a 
"preventive" procedure. And under the GEM's Outline of Coverage, 
the dental benefit for "preventive" dental care is paid at 100%, 
A hundred percent would include all hospital charges. This 
directly contradicts the exclusion. Record, @ 113, point 5, 
Optional Coverage. 
GENERAL vs. LOCAL ANESTHESIA; 
In their Brief Plaintiffs assert that several provisions of the 
dental policy are inconsistent with the exclusion. One such 
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provision provided that, "General anesthesia is a benefit only 
when used in conjunction with oral surgery." Brief, @ 13-15 
Record, @ 254, point 3. That is, it is a benefit only when used 
in a hospital setting and "general anesthesia and oral surgery 
must be provided by different providers," Understandably, the 
Atkinsons could reasonably believe that because the general 
anesthesia was covered, so were the hospital charges. Defendants 
now argue that this is not inconsistent with the exclusion 
because teeth extractions, even with anesthesia, are usually done 
in a dentist's office. Defendants' Brief, @ 19, Defendants, 
however, fail to distinguish between *local* and "general" 
anesthesia. General anesthesia is usually done in a hospital 
setting by an anesthesiologist while a local anesthesia can be 
administered in a dental office by a dentist. Moreover, the 
Defendants' argument violates the policy requirement that the 
care ube provided by different providers", i,e., the dentist 
can't provide the anesthesia. Finally, local anesthesia is not a 
covered benefit. See, Record Point 7, pages 109 & 254. 
It is widely understood that general anesthesia is a delicate 
medical procedure that can cause many serious complications 
including death. Defendants' argument ignores both this and 
Dr. Walker's position: 
. . . . Due to the extensive nature of her oral 
surgery and her co-existent cardiac disease, she 
will require monitoring under the care of an 
anesthesiologist during her oral surgery. Record, @ 257. 
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Another important point is that while the policy requires a 
licensed dentist, Mrs. Atkinson's surgery was performed by 
Dr. Walker a dentist, a medical doctor, a surgeon and a Diplomat 
of the American Board of Oral and Maxillofacial Surgery. Record, 
253 point 4, 257. Clearly, the anesthesia required here was not a 
novocain injection and this surgery was not simply "pulling a 
tooth." 
DEFENDANTS' OFF-POINT ARGUMENTS: 
1) Defendants miss the point when they argue that that an 
insurer could exclude coverage for cancer or that this policy 
excludes treatment for injuries sustained during the commission 
of a felony. They attempt to use these loose examples as 
analogies to the present exclusion. Brieff page 16. But they miss 
the point in assuming that the cancer and felony exclusions are 
unambiguous. If, like the exclusion in contest, these exclusions 
are ambiguous then they would not be enforceable. 
Instantly, the pivotal issue surrounds the question of whether 
the exclusion is ambiguous, not whether an insurer has a right to 
draft exclusions into an insurance policy. 
2) Plaintiffs cited legal authority that reflects that 
insurance policy provisions must be construed from the 
perspective an average, reasonable purchaser of insurance. 
Plaintiffs' Brief, @ 23. Defendants have not disputed this. 
9 
Defendants' Brief, 13,14, & 17. But, Defendants then go on to 
argue the interpretation should be from a legal or judicial 
perspective. On page 18 of their brief, Defendants admit to 
ambiguity between provisions of the policy. Continuing, they 
argue that the court should enforce the specific provisions of 
the exclusion (which exclude all hospital changes incurred xvin 
conjunction with dentistry') over the general provisions which 
(Defendants admit) would pay such costs as hospital room and 
board charges. 
Again, Defendants miss the point. The question is: Is the 
exclusion ambiguous to the average, reasonable purchaser of 
insurance? The average, reasonable purchaser of insurance would 
surely be confused by Defendants argument requiring a court to 
prefer an interpretation of a specific exclusion over a general 
provision providing coverage. The ambiguity question is 
determined from the perspective of the average, reason-able, 
purchaser of insurance not from a court's perspective. At least, 
Defendants' argument does admit to the ambiguity. Accordingly, 
the exclusion cannot be enforced. 
3) Another example wherein Defendants miss the point in contest 
is when they assert that: 
Utah has expressly rejected the doctrine of reasonable 
expectations, holding that the reasonable expectations 
of an insured may not be used to enforce a contract 
when those expectations conflict with the plain terms 
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of the policy. . . . Therefore, Plaintiffs have no 
claim based on the reasonable expectations doctrine. 
Brief, @ 21-21. 
The point ignored/missed is that the Atkinsons' "reasonable 
expectations" are not in "conflict with the plain terms of the 
policy." The Atkinson's reasonable expectations do not conflict 
with any "plain terms* of the exclusion. The Atkinsons believe 
the exclusion is not plain, but rather ambiguous both in itself 
and when read in references to other provisions of the policy. 
The exclusion's ambiguities conflict with their "reasonable 
expectations." So, while Defendants' case law citations may be 
correct statements of the law, the factual application they 
attempt to plug into this law is fatally defective. 
ISSUES OTHER THAN COVERAGE ISSUES: 
In a footnote on page 4 of their Brief, Defendants argue that 
because: 1) Defendants moved for summary judgment on all the 
issues and because 2) Judge Wilkinson granted summary judgment on 
all the issues and because 3) Appellants' did not address the 
other issues in their opening brief but addressed only the 
coverage question, summary judgment on the other causes of action 
must stand. 
Reference to the record however, proves otherwise. Plaintiffs' 
brief addressed only the exclusion issue because Judge Wilkinson 
mandated this approach. He granted summary judgement on all the 
issues when he found the exclusion was not ambiguous. Record @ 
293; page 12, line 20 to page 13, line 7. 
Commonsense dictates that: 
If Judge Wilkinson voided Plaintiffs' entire Complaint 
because he found the exclusionary clause was not ambiguous, 
then if Plaintiffs prevail in this appeal, all their 
causes of action should be brought back from limbo. 
At the 04/18/97 hearing, Judge Wilkinson heard oral arguments 
from Mr. Fife. Initially, Mr. Fife asked the court if he should 
address the other, vclaims against GEMf first", but the Court 
said no and directed him to speak only to the coverage question. 
Record, 293; page 4, lines 18-24. Later, after arguing the 
coverage question, Mr. Fife asked the Court if he should address 
any other questions. The Court replied, *No, I wanted to hear 
just that", Recordf @ 293; page 7, lines 6-8. 
Plaintiffs' counsel, Mr. Fay, then argued the coverage question. 
Record, @ 293; pages 7-11. After finishing his coverage question 
arguments, Mr. Fay inquired, "Is there any other issue the court 
would like me to address?" The court said, "No." Record, @ 293; 
page 11, lines 6-8. 
Mr. Fife then commenced his rebuttal argument addressed solely to 
the coverage dispute. Record, @ 293; page 11. When Mr. Fay 
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asked the court if he could respond, the court said, No. Recordf 
@ 293; page 12, lines 13-15. Immediately thereafter, the court 
threw-out Plaintiffs' entire Complaint because it found the 
exclusion was not ambiguous. Record, 293, page 12:20 to 13:7, 
At the hearing, on four different occasions the Court refused to 
permit arguments addressed to other issues. Thus, the record 
from the hearing is silent on all references to other causes of 
action upon which Plaintiffs could mount arguments in their favor 
to cause reversal of the court's summary judgment. 
Plaintiffs addressed all the information that was available from 
the court hearing in their Opening Brief. And, while earlier they 
made written arguments addressed to these other claims, there is 
no reference how the court ruled on these arguments save exactly 
what Plaintiffs have addressed. 
One of the California Maxims of Jurisprudence is: 
WHEN THE REASON IS THE SAME 
THE RULE SHOULD BE THE SAME. 
Cal* Civil Code: 3511 
Here the reason the Court voided the Plaintiff's entire Complaint 
was because of its' finding on the coverage question. Accord-
ingly, if the Court was wrong on the coverage question, all the 
claims should be reinstated, because that was the only known 
ground upon which they were voided. 
In State v. Irwin. 924 P2d 5, (UT Ct. App., 1996) the court said: 
AN APPELLATE COURT MAY ADDRESS AN ISSUE RAISED FOR 
THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL IF APPELLANT ESTABLISHES 
THAT THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PLAIN ERROR, IF THERE 
ARE EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES, • . . 
The Irwin court continued: 
The exceptional circumstances concept serves to 
assure that manifest injustice does not result 
from the failure to consider an issue on appeal. 
Plaintiffs offer that when the trial court closed-off all 
arguments on all the other issues, it committed plain error and 
for this Tribunal to refuse to consider all those other issues 
would result in manifest injustice to Plaintiffs. 
SURVIVING ISSUE: 
Plaintiffs assert that notwithstanding everything else, one issue 
still survived summary judgment, i.e., the reasons underlying 
Premier's refusal to pre-certify Plaintiffs' request for 
benefits. 
Repeatedly, Premier has asserted it pre-authorized the surgery, 
but refused to pre-authorize the hospital charges because of the 
exclusion, " (Record, @ 70 & 164, point 6, and Plaintiffs' Brief 
pages 34-36) Plaintiffs claim this is false. Plaintiffs assert 
Premier denied Atkinson's request for benefits because the 
request, Mid not meet (Premier's) criteria for medical necessity 
or appropriateness." See, Record, 6, point 12; 36 point 12; 146, 
191 @ point 4, and Appendix *A* to Appellants' Opening Brief. 
In their brief, Defendants argue that: 
Defendants delineated the undisputed, material facts . . . 
including the reason for Premier's refusal to pre-certifv 
Mrs. Atkinson's hospital expenses . . . These factual 
issues were addressed in the affidavits of Sara Meadow-
croft who had personal knowledge of the facts." 
Defendants' Brief @ 12. 
And further, Appellants should have filed an affidavit to counter 
Meadowcroft's allegations. Because they did not, their claim must 
fail. Defendants' Brief @ 12. 
This is plain error. Plaintiffs direct the Court to Meadow-
croft's affidavits. Recordf @ 62-66 and 219-221. Meadowcroft's 
affidavits are not nearly so broad as Defendants would like this 
Court to believe. In her affidavits, Meadowcroft swears: 
• She works for GEM# examined GEM#s file and has 
personal knowledge of the GEM file. 
• GEM refused to pay for the claim for hospital 
charges relying on the dental exclusion. 
Record @ 62-63 
In her second affidavit she states: 
She works for GEM, reviewed GEM'S file and has 
personal knowledge of the GEM file. 
Pursuant to the terms of Ms. Atkinson's health and 
dental insurance policies, GEM refused to pay for the 
claim from the facility at which the surgery was 
performed. 
GEM adjudicated the claim for the anesthesiologist, 
the dentist and for the tooth extraction surgery. 
Ms. Atkinson's surgery was performed at a facility 
within GEM's preferred provider organization, 
accordingly her deductible was $1400. And, if the 
policy permitted payment for the facility, GEM would 
have paid $232.70, 
Record @ 219-221 
Meadowcroft's affidavits make no mention that: 
• She ever worked for PREMIER; or that, 
• She reviewed any Premier records, or that, 
• She has personal knowledge of the Premier file; 
or that, 
• She knows Premier pre-authorized the surgery, but 
refused to pre-authorize the hospital charges 
because of the exclusion. 
So. what Defendants have asserted that MEADOWCROFT knew and 
testified-to through her affidavits is blatantly false. 
Accordingly, Plaintiffs were not required to file a rebuttal 
affidavit to issues not addressed by Meadowcroft's affidavits, 
1 & 
Plaintiffs assert Premier denied Atkinson's request for benefits 
because it, Mid not meet our criteria for medical necessity or 
appropriateness." Record @ 6 point 12, 146, 191 @ point 4, 
Premier denied this allegation in their Answer, Record, ©36, 
point 12. See also Appendix WA" to Appellant's Opening Brief. 
Defendants also allege Plaintiffs did not contest this issue at 
trial and accordingly, the claim should fail. But as shown 
supra, Plaintiffs have addressed the trial court's repeated 
refusal to hear any arguments except the coverage dispute 
arguments. Thus, when the court foreclosed argument on this 
issue, Plaintiffs should not be charged with a failure to bring 
it before the trial court. 
Defendants also allege plaintiffs did not raise this against them 
in the summary judgment motion. This is manifest error, see the 
Record at pages 146 and 191, point 4. 
All these issues were before the trial court. In Judge 
Wilkinson's order it says: 
. , . the court, having heard oral argument by counsel 
for the parties, having reviewed the various motions 
and supporting memorandum and the file herein, . . . 
Record, 276. 
According to the Judge's order all the arguments and points and 
authorities were before the court and reviewed by it before it 
decided to grant the summary judgment. Thus, all such issues are 
before this Tribunal. 
The last objection Defendants make on this issue is that it is 
not material to any of the Plaintiffs claims. Brief, 28-30. 
Defendants' repeatedly have alleged, "Premier pre-authorized the 
surgery but refused to pre-authorize the hospital charges based 
upon an exclusion in the policy . . . " Brief, pages 3, 5 @ point 
6; and 8. Plaintiffs point out that Premier advised them they 
refused to authorize any part of the surgery because the 
Atkinson's request, "did not meet (Premier's) criteria for 
medical necessity or appropriateness." Is this material? 
Plaintiffs say Premier refused their request because it wasn't 
"medically necessary and appropriate". Yet, Defendants say 
Premier pre-authorized the surgery but refused to authorize the 
hospital charges because of the exclusion. In reviewing Appendix 
yy&" to Plaintiffs Opening Brief, we find Premier directly 
contradicted by its' own document. Obviously, Premier is lying. 
If Plaintiffs can show this lying to a jury they substantially 
support their charge of Premier's misrepresentations. 
Also, Plaintiffs have complained against Premier for breaches of 
their duties of good faith and fair dealings owed Plaintiffs. 
Beck, supra, at 801, says: 
1 P 
, . , the implied duty of good faith performance contem-
plates, at the very least, that the insurer will diligently 
investigate the facts to enable it to determine whether a 
claim is valid, will fairly evaluate the claim .... 
. . . and to refrain from action that will injure the 
insured's ability to obtain the benefits of the contract. 
Plaintiffs have alleged Premier did not diligently investigate 
the claim or fairly evaluate it. Plain-tiffs allege this because 
four medical doctors (3 of which are Premier approved providers) 
told Premier this surgery was necessary and appropriate. Con-
sequently, Premier's misrepresentations will support Plaintiffs' 
action for bad faith. And it would support Plaintiffs' alle-
gations that when Premier failed to diligently investigate and 
fairly evaluate their request, Premier engaged v>in actions that 
injured the Atkinson's ability to obtain the benefits of their 
contract". Beck @ 801. 
These facts convincingly show that Premier's representations were 
material to Plaintiffs' claims of bad faith and misrepresentation 
Such conduct violates U.C.A. 31A-26-3Q3 (2)(a), (3)(b) and (h). 
In their Brief at page 29, Defendants cited two cases: Wilder v» 
Tanouve, 753 P2d. 816,821 (HA, 1991) for the proposition that: A 
fact is material if, 
once proved, it would have the effect of establishing or 
refuting one of the essential elements of a r use of 
action . . . 
And, Atherton Condo Bd. V. Blume Development, 799 P2d. 250, 257, 
(WA, 1990) for the premise: 
A material fact i s also one upon which the outcome 
of the l i t i ga t ion depends in whole or in par t . 
P la in t i f fs adopt th is case law. Plainly, the reasons why Prexaier 
denied the Atkinson's request for benefits i s material to thei r 
charges of bad faith and misrepresentation. Premier's 
representation can establish their bad fai th. The charges of bad 
fa i th and misrepresentation will depend upon the reason Premier 
denied the P la in t i f f s ' claim for benefits. 
Defendants complain P l a i n t i f f s wove argument i n t o t h e i r Rule 56(e) a f f i d a v i t . 
Defendants ' Br ief , page 26, f t n t . 8, and page 27, f t n t . 9. P l a i n t i f f s admit 
t h i s . In a d d r e s s i n g the very same i s s u e i n Broadwater v . Old Republic, supra , 
a t 532, t h e c o u r t s a i d : 
Defendants a s s a i l two of the a f f i d a v i t s submit ted by p l a i n t i f f 
because they con ta in opinion, l e g a l conc lus ions , and f a c t s not 
suppor ted by adequate foundat ion . Although a review of the 
a f f i d a v i t s confirm t h i s assessment , p o r t i o n s of the a f f i d a v i t s do 
comply wi th Rule 5 6 ( e ) . The o b j e c t i o n a b l e s t a t emen t s c o n s i s t of 
l e g a l arguments and conclus ions and d id no th ing more than 
supplement t he arguments made in p l a i n t i f f ' s memorandum. We f a i l 
t o see how t h i s prejudiced defendants. 
DEFENDANTS ADMISSION THAT SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS 
NOT WARRANTED TO SOME OF THE CAUSES OF ACTION. 
Defendants told the trial court that, "with regard to a few of 
Plaintiff's claims" further discovery might "lead to facts 
supporting their claims to the extent that those claims may be 
based on issues1* other than the coverage dispute. Record, 162. 
Defendants also told the court: 
. . . Plaintiffs could discover additional facts 
supporting their claim that Defendants intentionally 
inflicted emotional distress on or made misrepresentations 
to Plaintiffs" outside of denying their claim for the 
hospital charges. To the extent that discovery may aid 
Plaintiffs in establishing these facts, they should be 
allowed to conduct such discovery. . . • 
Record, 176 ftnt. 10 
C O N C L U S I O N : 
Long before the controversy arose between the Atkinsons and the 
Defendants, an unbiased, professional evaluated the Atkinson's 
request for benefits. Dr. Crayton Walker, as a Premier approved 
provider and one of Mrs. Atkinson's doctors, would seem to offer 
a neutral evaluation. His evaluation would be competent in that 
he is a dentist, an M.D., a surgeon and a Diplomat of the 
American Board of Oral and Maxillofacial Surgery. Before this 
dispute arose, Dr. Walker said: 
I act as an insurance review expert in oral and maxillo-
facial surgery for Alta Health Strategies and the MRI 
Institute of America. This scheduled surgery is appro-
priate and necessary for the care of this patient. I feel 
that this hospitalization should be authorized and should 
be covered under the patient's major medical insurance plan. 
She is not a candidate for outpatient surgery. 
Record, 259. 
EXCLUSIONS MUST BE CLEAR. 
In Alf v. State Farm, 850 P2d. 1272, 1275 (UT 1993) and in 
Village Inn v. State Farm, 790 P2d. 581, 583; (UTApp., 1990) 
quoting Wagner v, Farmers Ins. Exchange, 786 P2d, 763,764; (UT 
App. 1990) our court have repeatedly held: 
The insurer may exclude from coverage certain losses 
by using "language which clearly and unmistakably 
communicates to the insured the specific circumstances 
under which the expected coverage will not be provided. " 
The phrase in ''conjunction with dentistry" did not ''clearly and 
unmistakably communicate" to the Atkinsons the "specific 
circumstances under which the coverage they expected would not be 
provided." Nor, when the Atkinsons read the entire policy with 
all the medical and dental benefits does the solitary exclusion 
become plain and "clearly and unmistakably communicate" to them 
exactly what is not covered. 
DEFENDANTS1 INTERPRETATION 
UNREASONABLY RESTRICTS COVERAGE. 
Defendants want a strict, literal interpretation of the 
exclusion. But: 
or> 
Where a strict, literal interpretation of a clause would 
unreasonably restrict coverage of the insurance policy, 
such an interpretation cannot be foisted onto a layman nor 
can it be defended in terms of the risks which the layman 
sought to insure against. 
Miller v. Elite Ins. Co.,10 CA3d.739; 
161 Cal. Rptr. 322, 328-329 (CA 1990) 
To side with the Defendants' interpretation can cause absurd 
results clearly not intended. For instance, assume: 
Mrs. Atkinson was involved in a serious motor vehicle 
collision wherein her face was forcefully propelled 
into the steering wheel. Six teeth were knocked out 
but all six were recovered. 
Rushed to hospital, the emergency room dental surgeon 
used hundreds of stitches to restore the separated 
teeth back into the jaw. 
Comes now defendants and deny all the hospital charges 
because replacing the teeth was Mental work" and hospital 
charges in conjunction with dental work are excluded. 
The interpretation the Defendants want to impose on the Atkinsons 
tortures commonsense. Plaintiffs wanted full coverage, so they 
purchased both medical and dental coverage. The hospital charges 
should have been paid because the exclusion is ambiguous, and 
because the nature of the surgery took it out of dental care and 
into medical care. 
SURGERY WAS A MEDICALLY NECESSARY SICKNESS 
PROCEDURE. 
Under the terms of the policy, the need for the surgery should 
properly be classified as a "medically necessary" "sickness" 
benefit. ^Sickness" is defined as "an illness or disease which 
first manifest itself after the effective date of coverage and 
while the insurance is in force.1' Record, 100-101 and 244. 
Defendants make no contest that this surgical need first 
manifested itself after the effective date of the policy. 
"Medically necessary1' is defined as: Service supplies or 
accommodations received for Sickness or which are: 
. • « . 
(b) received in the most appropriate setting (here the 
hospital); 
(d) appropriate for the diagnosis or treatment of a 
Sickness or injury based on generally accepted medical 
practice in your State; and, 
(e) would adversely affect the condition or quality of 
medical care received if omitted as determined by 
established medical review mechanisms. 
Record, 100 & 244. 
Plaintiff's four treating doctors have attested that the 
hospital setting was most appropriate and that 
Mrs. Atkinson was not a candidate for outpatient care. 
Record, 256-259. Given that three of the four doctors are 
Premier approved physicians this should qualify them as an 
established medical review. Thus, this surgery fits 
perfectly under a "medically necessary sickness" benefit. 
RELIEF REQUESTED* 
Plaintiffs respectfully request this Tribunal to reverse the 
summary judgment because it went against the weight of the 
evidence, because the court committed plain error in precluding a 
full hearing on all the issues and because it results in 
substantial injustice to the Atkinsons. 
Gene & Sharon Atkinson 
**FplyBri«£ 
C E R T I F I C A T E OF S E R V I C E ; 
I, John F. Fay declare that on the •fa of May, 1998, at approximately 
^ -^ , o' clock, I personally delivered two copies of Plaintiffs'/Appellants' 
Reply Brief to KEVIN FIFE, Esq. Counsel for Defendants. 
Said services was made at: 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL 
525 Eas t 100 So., Suite 500 
Salt Lake, UT 84111 
I m a d e th i s Declaration u n d e r the penal t ies of perjury of the laws of 
the State of Utah. If called a s a wi tness I could and would testify to 
the t r u t h hereinabove. 
Executed in Salt Lake, th is o day of May, 1998. 
JOHN F. FAY, Esq. 
Legal Counsel for Plaintiffs /Appel lants . 
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